AUKUS was announced in September 2021 and presented as a countering Chinese presence in the Indo-Pacific region. The agreement aimed to provide Australia with nuclear-powered submarines and deepening military agreement among the US, the UK, and Australia. Official narratives framed AUKUS primarily as a deterrence to China and aimed at maintaining balance of power in the Indo-Pacific.
However, a closer examination suggests that before AUKUS, France almost reached a deal on Submarines with Australia. But at the last moment, the US entered in between, and the deal was cancelled and AUKUS was born.
Hence, AUKUS had consequences that extended beyond China-centric strategic calculations. The speculated reason for the removal of France was geopolitical contestation between the US and France. One of its most consequential outcomes was the limiting of France from a central security role in the Indo-Pacific. This effect was not incidental.
Understanding why AUKUS had such a profound impact on France requires recognising a foundational fact: France is not an external actor in the Indo-Pacific. It is structurally embedded in the region. So, let’s start with knowing the French presence in the region.
Why France Is Already a Major Indo-Pacific Power
France’s Indo-Pacific role is grounded in geography rather than strategy alone. Unlike most European states, France exercises sovereignty over overseas territories located across both the Indian and Pacific Oceans. These include Réunion and Mayotte in the Indian Ocean, and New Caledonia, French Polynesia, and Wallis and Futuna in the Pacific.
These territories provide France with the second-largest Exclusive Economic Zone globally, the majority of which lies within the Indo-Pacific. This means a concrete strategic interest. Over 1.6 million French citizens live in the region, and France is responsible for their security and economic stability.
As a result, France has to keep its military presence in the Indo-Pacific region. It means naval assets, air bases and ground forces in the region are imperative for France.
This provides France with three key attributes: strategic legitimacy as a resident power, operational capability through permanent military presence, and sustained political credibility with regional states. France’s Indo-Pacific engagement is therefore driven by territorial obligations and long-term interests rather than alliance signalling or short-term balancing behaviour.
France’s Strategic Partnerships, Especially with India
France’s position in the Indo-Pacific is further understood through its network of strategic partnerships. Among these, the relationship with India is particularly noteworthy.
France and India have developed a comprehensive strategic partnership encompassing defence technology transfer, joint military exercises, maritime domain awareness cooperation, and intelligence coordination. The Rafale fighter aircraft agreement exemplifies this relationship, as does France’s consistent support for India’s strategic autonomy within the international system.
Unlike several Western actors, France has avoided framing India as a subordinate security partner. Instead, it has recognised India as an independent Indo-Pacific actor with its own strategic priorities. This approach has enabled sustained defence cooperation without alliance-based constraints.
Beyond India, France has expanded defence and security cooperation with Australia, Japan, Indonesia, and multiple Southeast Asian states. Its regional approach has emphasised inclusive multilateralism and avoided rigid bloc formation. France formally articulated its Indo-Pacific strategy in 2018, prior to the European Union’s adoption of a similar framework, positioning itself as a conduit between European security interests and Indo-Pacific stability.
This background is essential for assessing the strategic value of the Australia–France submarine agreement and AUKUS.
Why the Australia Deal Mattered So Much to France
The submarine agreement signed between France and Australia in 2016 represented a long-term strategic commitment rather than a conventional arms sale. Under the contract, France’s Naval Group was to design and construct 12 conventionally powered submarines for the Royal Australian Navy, with a total program value estimated at €56 billion.
While the financial scale of the agreement was substantial, its primary importance lay in its strategic implications. The project was designed to integrate French technology, Australian industrial capacity, and shared operational doctrines over several decades.
Through this arrangement, France would have remained embedded within Australia’s undersea warfare planning and naval force development. This would have ensured sustained French influence over the regional maritime balance and reinforced its status as a core Indo-Pacific security partner.
From a strategic angle, the agreement institutionalised France’s role in Indo-Pacific security architecture. Its termination therefore, represented not merely a contract cancellation, but a structural disruption of France’s regional positioning.
What Kind of Deal Was It, Really?
The submarine agreement was characterised by deep industrial and strategic integration. France committed to extensive technology transfer, and Australian firms were incorporated into the construction and maintenance ecosystem. Most submarines were to be built domestically in Adelaide, ensuring long-term industrial cooperation.
Such arrangements generate expectations of continuity, transparency, and political consultation. Under established international practice and contractual norms, major defence agreements of this nature are typically modified through structured renegotiation rather than unilateral termination.
French officials operated under the assumption that any significant change in Australian requirements would be communicated through established diplomatic and contractual channels. This assumption was reinforced by repeated public and private reassurances from Australian leadership that the program remained viable.
These expectations were undermined by subsequent developments.
How the Deal Was Subverted
Parallel to its public commitment to the French submarine program, Australia initiated confidential discussions with the US and the UK regarding access to nuclear-powered submarine technology. These discussions were conducted without informing France and were restricted to a narrow circle of officials.
France was excluded from these deliberations despite being Australia’s primary submarine partner and despite the scale of the existing contractual relationship. Even senior French defence and diplomatic officials were not made aware of the shift until immediately prior to the public announcement of AUKUS.
The termination of the French contract was communicated to Paris only hours before the new trilateral partnership was unveiled. This sequence of events led France to conclude that the process involved intentional concealment rather than routine strategic reassessment. In other words, according to France, Australia backstabbed them with this deal.
The Sudden Emergence of AUKUS and the US Role
One have to understand AUKUS reflected long-standing US objectives to deepen military integration among select allies and maintain technological primacy in critical defence domains. Nuclear propulsion sharing aligned with these goals and strengthened interoperability within a restricted alliance framework.
However, AUKUS also had the effect of reordering regional leadership structures. By consolidating advanced undersea capabilities within an exclusive Anglosphere grouping, the agreement sidelined France as a security actor of comparable capability and presence. The transition was not limited to a change in platform technology. It undermines a shift from a plural security architecture, which included European participation, to a narrower hierarchy centred on US-led alliance structures.
AUKUS Vs France: From Trilateral Cooperation to Strategic Exclusion
Prior to AUKUS, France, Australia, and the US maintained a functional pattern of trilateral cooperation. This included joint exercises, coordinated maritime operations, and intelligence sharing. The formation of AUKUS disrupted this framework. Decision-making was centralised within a closed grouping, and existing partners were excluded from deliberations that directly affected their strategic interests.
France interpreted this shift as a move away from cooperative security management towards selective alliance consolidation. The exclusion was therefore understood as intentional rather than accidental.
France’s Response: Diplomatic Shockwaves
France’s response reflected the severity with which it assessed the situation. The recall of French ambassadors from Washington and Canberra was an unusual measure among allied states and signalled a breach of trust. French official statements emphasised the procedural and normative dimensions of the issue rather than the material loss alone. The focus was on the absence of consultation, the secrecy surrounding negotiations, and the implications for alliance credibility.
At the European level, the episode intensified debates over strategic autonomy and the reliability of transatlantic security arrangements. It also prompted reassessment of European engagement strategies in the Indo-Pacific.
China Was the Pretext, France Was the Casualty
AUKUS is frequently justified as a response to China’s growing assertiveness. However, its immediate strategic consequence was the displacement of France from a central role in Indo-Pacific security arrangements.
France did not oppose efforts to balance China’s influence. Its objection centred on exclusion from decision-making processes, the erosion of contractual and diplomatic norms, and the restructuring of regional security architecture without consultation.
In the longer term, the episode raises questions about alliance management, trust, and the sustainability of exclusive security frameworks in a complex multipolar region. Marginalising an established resident power may ultimately weaken, rather than strengthen, the broader objective of regional stability.
To conclude, Australia is in need of a multilateral deterrence, which obviously can be led only by the US. Thus, It is not about disengagement, it is about diversification. It is not about choosing Independent foreign policy by disengaging with the US, rather it is about achieving more autonomy through diversification. In this context, diversification of security needs.
Australia, with its deal with France, had a chance of diversification. It certainly had a chance to come out of its ‘Fear of Abandonment’ shell that is tightly linked to the US and steer its foreign policy with more autonomy as a regional power. With the idea of AUKUS coming out of the blue, the US has made sure that the Indo-Pacific stays under its influence and no other major power gets consolidated (France). Though the AUKUS is a success for both the US and Australia, the agreement is seen as yet another formation that keeps Australia’s foreign policy lingering around the Anglosphere grouping.
