An Overview of Australia’s Defence Policy

Australia’s defence policy has evolved through various phases. Largely, Australia’s strategic interests were mostly confined to the geo-strategic area of the Indo-Pacific region; as historically threats to Australia have emerged from Southeast Asia. While over the time, the changes in the balance of power among great powers and Australia’s internal capability to respond to threats led to adoption of different strategies.

The Need for ANZUS Treaty

Initially its identity of being a former British Colony and World War I, led Australia to tie itself with the collective strategic imperative of the British Empire. Although this arrangement lasted till the 1940s, with the outbreak of World War II both Britain and Australia started to look for another powerful nation for assistance. Thus the situation gave birth to the ANZUS treaty.

What is the ‘Forward Defence’ strategy ?

The signing of the Australia, New Zealand and the U.S. (ANZUS) treaty in the 1951 led to the formation of an alliance between the three. The era between the 1950-75s was marked as Australia’s “Forward Defence”. During this period, Australia framed its foreign policy with the objective of it being supported by the great protectors. Australia strategist alignment was defined by the strategic interests pursued by the U.S and it was prevalent in how Australia showed its loyalty by taking the spread of communism seriously.

Alongside, this was also the period when Australia started to project itself as Middle Power. However, with the loss of America in the Vietnam War and the emphasis of the Nixon Doctrine over the allied states to do more for their own security, made Australia to manoeuvre their foreign policy to be more self-reliant.

Australia’s Attempt to be ‘Self-reliant’

The period from 1975-97, Australia produced defence white papers in 1976, 1987 and 1994. This period saw the inclusion of the term “self-reliant” in Australia’s defence policy. The 1987 white paper presented “the strategy of denial” which laid stress upon bridging Australia’s air and sea capabilities so as to deter any invading force in the future. In addition, the structural changes induced with the end of the bipolar world order, shifts in regional order of Asia- Pacific and the emphasis laid over globalisation and interdependence, redirected Australia to place higher degree of importance on supporting regional engagement and Australia’s strategic alliances.

Furthermore, the subsequent defence white papers of 2003, 2009 (Defending Australia in the Asia-Pacific Century- Force 2030), 2012 and 2016 have categorically highlighted the risks of global terrorism, building of internal capabilities, threats faced with the rise in China’s assertiveness and commitment of investment in defence sector.

Australia’s Defence Strategy of Denial

The Australian Defence White Paper of 2016 have specifically mentioned about the “strategy of denial” which is to “to deter, deny and defeat any attempt by a hostile country or non-state actor to attack, threaten to coerce Australia”.

The strategy of denial dates back to the Defence White Paper of 1987 which stressed that Australia’s priority concern would be to deny the adversary effective use of the sea and air gap.
Among the strategies of denial there are three major strands- anti-access denial, area-denial and dissuasion by denial.

1. Anti-access denial seeks to deter an opponent from attacking the mainland by possessing military capabilities. The aim is to stop the adversaries from crossing the sea-air gap to Australia’s North. It is a militarily demanding strategy which requires the ability to block a determinant opponent from projecting force into an area.
2. Area-denial operates along multiple domains such as sea, air, land and cyber. The crux of area-denial is to deter an opponent by making it too unsafe for the adversary to be close within the striking distance of the Australian mainland. It is done by defeating the opponent’s forces from gaining complete control of an area.
3. The third strand is dissuasion by denial which raises the cost for the opponent. It is done by deterring the opponent from an action by convincing them that they can no longer use force to achieve their political objective at a reasonable cost.

Given the gist, the strategies of denial is very context specific. The rationale behind the adoption of these strategies will depend on how Australia defines its strategic interests, perceives its strategic environment, threat and extent of internal capability. For instance, in the Defence White Paper of 2016 Australia has emphasised over the strategic importance of the Indo-Pacific region, the continuance of the U.S. alliance and the threats from China’s growing assertiveness. In terms of threats, specific strategies will be used based on the nature of the threat. In short, the strategy of denial is not a “one size fits all” strategy.

Australia’s Deterrence By Denial Strategy

With the beginning of the 2020s, Australia has been living in a complex strategic environment which is characterised by- wars in Europe and the Middle East, China’s aggressive actions in the Indo-Pacific region, the chaos of climate change, the re-election of the Trump administration and the emergence of technological competition over artificial intelligence.

Given these challenges, on 17th April 2024 the Australian government had unveiled two documents- National Defence Strategy of 2024 (NDS-24) and Integrated Investment Program of 2024 (IIP-24). The NDS is designed based on the concerns which were addressed in the National Defence Strategy of 2023. For instance, the NDS-24 has approved the investment of A$42.1 billion on defence especially on submarines and their infrastructure over the decade. In addition, the NDS-24 has also prioritized increased investment in the collaboration under AUKUS to enhance undersea warfare capabilities.

Can SSN submarines truly deter adversaries?

Regardless of the positive development and precision in Australia’s strategy, the process of trying to deter an adversary is complex. There are all-encompassing capabilities and forces. In addition, there should also be an intent to use those capabilities and forces whenever there is an attack by an adversary. On the other hand, Michael Clarke has pointed at the vagueness of Australia’s strategy in terms of its usage of nuclear-powered submarines (SSN). He questions the lack of intent and strategy to put the SSN submarines in use.

This vagueness, according to him, questions the effectiveness of the deterrence capability of Australia. In addition, although the NDS-24 has emphasised over the procurement of submarines but given the slow rate of production and the constraints faced by the U.S. Navy Shipyards, it will also have an implicit effect on Australia’s submarine procurement till the 2030s.

Limitations of Workforce in Australia’s Defence Forces

In addition, the NDS-24 has planned to increase defence workforce funding from A$17.1 billion to A$25.2 billion so as to facilitate the importance of a skilled workforce for maintaining and operating military capabilities. However, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) is composed of only 80,000 personnels. The concern is whether the augmented defence budget is going to lead to the recruitment of more defence personnels in the future or not. The crux is that to curate a well-defined strategy of deterrence by denial, the size of the ADF should be enough to pose a threat in the minds of potential adversaries.

The strategy of NDS-24 is predominantly a military strategy which lacks a proper definition of a national security strategy. Nevertheless overall, the NDS-24 is a construct which gives a useful description of Australia’s strategic environment and the course of the government’s defence policy directions. It is also an ambitious defence strategy which has its target till 2033-34.

The realisation of this strategy will depend both on Australia’s domestic politics, the government’s urge to increase its defence spending and also the relation with the Trump administration. It is needless to state that the AUKUS is one of the important components of NDS-24 and much of it will rely on how Australia is going to pursue its self-interests in the times where the Trump administration 2.0 has openly embraced national supremacist outlook and transactional diplomacy.