For more than ten years, strategic autonomy has been one of India’s most important foreign policy ideas. It shows that if you are free from bloc politics, can resist outside pressure, and can act freely in a world that is becoming more and more divided. But the strength of that argument changes a lot depending on one thing: the price of oil.
When energy markets are stable and oil is cheap, autonomy is easy to claim and cheap to keep up. When prices go up and supply chains get tighter, autonomy becomes conditional, negotiated, and subtly limited. India’s reaction to recent global energy shocks, especially those involving sanctioned oil producers, shows that autonomy is more of a flexible approach to prices than a strict ideology. This is particularly evident when comparing India’s position to that of the United States in relation to Venezuela.
Autonomy in theory; compliance in practice
India has repeatedly contested the legitimacy of unilateral sanctions. Official pronouncements emphasize that New Delhi adheres to United Nations sanctions, not those imposed by individual governments or blocs. In essence, this places India as a supporter of sovereign equality and an opponent of coercive economic statecraft.
However, in fact, India’s energy policies are more cautious. Following US sanctions on Venezuela’s oil sector, Indian refiners, particularly Reliance and Nayara, steadily shifted away from Venezuelan crude, despite its heavy-grade appropriateness for Indian refineries. This retreat was not accompanied by diplomatic outcry or open resistance. It was quiet, technocratic, and presented as a business choice rather than a political surrender.
The argument was straightforward: at the time, India had options. Global oil supply was ample, pricing was manageable, and compliance had a low economic cost. Under those conditions, strategic autonomy was quite easy to achieve.
The American Exception
Compare this to Washington’s own actions when oil markets tightened. As global oil prices soared due to post-pandemic recovery, geopolitical uncertainty, and supply limits, the United States adjusted its Venezuela strategy. The enforcement of sanctions has relaxed. Licenses were issued. Negotiations with Caracas have resumed, not for democratic transformation, but for energy reasons.
This paradox reveals an unsettling truth: sanctions are harsh for allies but flexible for their authors. When oil markets dictated it, the United States could engage Venezuela without jeopardizing its overall sanctions strategy. India, on the other hand, bore the costs of compliance while not having the same degree of discretion. In this context, strategic autonomy referred to calibrated alignment under unequal pressure rather than equal freedom.
Oil Prices: Foreign Policy Stress Tests
India imports more than 85% of its crude oil. Energy security is not a theoretical worry; it is a macroeconomic weakness that influences inflation, fiscal stability, and political credibility. When oil prices skyrocket, autonomy shrinks.
This explains India’s pragmatic approach in recent crises. Following Western sanctions, Russian crude purchases increased, not as an ideological challenge to the West, but as a price-driven adjustment. Discounts mattered. Logistics were important. Domestic inflation was more important than reputational signals.
The same reasoning was used before on Iran and Venezuela, but the outcomes were different. In Iran’s case, waivers used to let India find a balance between freedom and access. India took a step back when the waivers ran out and other choices became available. In Venezuela, the math was the same: people talked about independence, but energy security called for restraint.
The trend is clear. India is against sanctions regimes in theory, but it only follows them when the economic cost of doing so is greater than the benefits.
Autonomy as a way to manage risk, not as a way to be defiant
This doesn’t mean that India isn’t free. This means that the definition of autonomy has changed.
India doesn’t use rebellion; instead, it uses risk-managed autonomy, which puts economic security ahead of ideological rhetoric. Price volatility, supply reliability, and financial risk are examples of exposure levels that affect decisions more than normative commitments do. This plan fits with India’s general trend in foreign policy. New Delhi doesn’t want to fight with the West or lead an anti-sanctions group. It wants space instead—to hedge, diversify, and negotiate within limits that it can’t change.
Venezuela shows how that method doesn’t always work. India did not contest the sanctions regime, as such an action would incur excessive costs without yielding strategic benefits. In this case, autonomy meant knowing when to back off.
The Global South Illusion
Much commentary implies that the Global South behaves as a cohesive bloc, resisting Western pressure. Venezuela demonstrates the instability of that assumption.
While sanctioned governments may ostensibly agree, energy-importing countries such as India confront structural dependencies that exporters do not. An oil-rich state has defensive autonomy, but an oil-importing state has conditional autonomy. India’s caution should be seen as an acknowledgment of asymmetry, not as a sign of weakness. In a system where rules aren’t always followed and some people get special treatment, autonomy is more about how strong you are than about what’s right.
When Cheap Oil Masks Constraints
The danger arises in mistaking periods of low oil prices for evidence of strategic independence. When prices drop, India appears autonomous. It withstands pressure, diversifies its suppliers, and communicates in the language of sovereignty. However, instead of eliminating structural reliance, these periods conceal it. The test comes when costs rise, choices become scarce, and autonomy necessitates actual trade-offs.
Venezuela, like Iran before it, demonstrates that India’s foreign policy is mostly constrained by markets, rather than relationships. Oil prices discipline governments more effectively than diplomacy.
Autonomy in a Post-Restrictive World
The new global order is one in which constraint is waning. Coercion continues without solutions. Sanctions remain in place till the regime changes. Engagement occurs without moral coherence. In this world, strategic autonomy cannot be absolute. It must be operational—designed to reduce exposure rather than claiming independence at any cost.
India understands this immediately. Its quiet on Venezuela, pragmatic approach to Russian crude, and cautious diplomacy with Washington all reflect an economic realism-driven foreign policy. However, realism should not be confused with comfort. As long as autonomy is dependent on cheap oil, it will be fragile. True strategic autonomy will not be achieved by rhetoric or selective resistance, but through structural changes such as energy diversification, increased domestic capacity, and less sensitivity to external price shocks.
Until then, autonomy will be easier when oil is cheap—and difficult when it counts the most.
