Is the “fear of abandonment” still relevant?

Based on the work of Allan Gyngell’s “Fear of Abandonment”, since WWII Australia’s foreign policy has been dictated by three strands- alliance, regional engagement and rules-based order.

Considering the beginning of the twentieth century, Gyngell has stated in his work that initially Australia’s and Britain’s security were inseparable. Thereby, the alignment choice of Australia pertains to the geopolitical lineages inherited from being a British colony. Furthermore, Australia’s closeness with the U.S. started both during the beginning of the Cold War and also when the U.S. got involved in Asia to check on the expansion of the Communist forces.

In yet another aspect, Australia always had the willingness to be closely associated with “great and powerful friends” since the time of its dominion autonomy in the 1920s. This in turn had instilled the urge to support the world order and its rules framed by its “powerful friends”. Perhaps, the impetus to follow and propagate the framed rules was the urge to be recognised by and the incentive to be one among the allies of the powerful in the international structure.

Fundamentally, it points to Alexander Wendt’s emphasis on the role of “ideas and identities” in international politics which ultimately guides the behaviour of the states. In this regard, gradually Australia’s identity of being a middle power and ally of the U.S. have acted as a catalyst to shape and influence its behaviour and policy making at an external level. On the other hand, Canberra’s motivating factor of its international engagements have been fear of abandonment and the rejection of isolationism.

However, Gyngell had also warned that uncertainties in the international structure might propel Australia to make shifts in its foreign policy. To put precisely, the erratic policies of the Trump administration and the rising rivalry between the U.S. and China, have become major concerns for Australia. As stated above, Australia’s has been emphasising on rules-based order; it will be interesting to watch how Australia is going to respond when the powerful alters the existing rules and Canberra’s reaction to the same. Therefore, these structural changes are going to test Australia’s motivating factors in the coming times.

The Shrinking Space for Australia in an Altering International Structure

Australia’s alliance with the U.S. has been consistent since the 1950’s. The bedrock of the strategic policy between the U.S. and Australia is the ANZUS treaty signed in 1951- a defensive pact between the U.S., Australia and New Zealand. Since the 1960s, Australia has followed an alliance-loyalty schema which has regularly influenced Canberra’s foreign policy.

In addition, Australia has always benefitted from the American influence as it has always maintained a mutually beneficial status quo. Beyond their strong military partnerships, the U.S. alliance delivers essential intelligence through the Five Eyes Intelligence Partnerships which has been continuing from the times of World War II. The motive of this multilateral alliance was to decrypt German and Japanese military codes.

Apart from this, it would be a mistake to state that ever since the signing of the ANZUS Treaty, Australia’s alignment behaviour toward the U.S. has been in a linear progression. Being an ally of the U.S., Australia has expected reciprocity from the former given the extent of the allegiance. For instance, Australia has been involved in the Korean Crisis and the Vietnam War due to the primary involvement of the U.S.

However, with the change in the world order from bipolar to a brief period of unipolarity followed by the present multipolar world order along with a prominent rise of China, have made alignment choices of the states more challenging. For instance, Australia shares a strong economic relationship with China. There are apprehensions that the rivalry between the U.S. and China might aggravate but the greater danger seems to be that the U.S. is no longer interested to play a significant role in the Indo-Pacific region. Meaning, the transactional nature of foreign policy that the Trump administration carries forward, tightly links economy with defence. The US is now more interested in securing the global supply chain and critical minerals as a transaction to the defence that it provides to its allies.

In addition, the US National Security Strategy issued in December 2017, took a confrontational take on China and Russia by depicting them as revisionist power and are inherently hostile to the U.S. interests.

Also, there is an increasing apprehension that if there is an outbreak of war between the U.S. and China over the Taiwan Strait, the U.S. might seek to integrate Australian assets, bases and even forces which would in turn put a question on Australia’s viability of its alignment choices.

The Trump administration has shown its disinterest to maintain alliances which has so far supported a global structure. There are vital changes in the global order which was earlier based on the intent of achieving growth through interdependence but has been currently replaced by a national supremacist approach. Given the present structural dynamics, any state which is under the U.S. security umbrella will find it utterly difficult to frame its independent foreign policy.

AUKUS : A Manifestation of ‘Fear of Abandonment’

Given the structural uncertainties and the continuing great-power competition between the U.S. and China, in September 2021, Australia entered into a new trilateral security agreement with the UK and the U.S. known as the AUKUS. The cost of the new security arrangement has been pitched around $368 billion. All in all, the agreement is the most comprehensive security arrangement in Australia’s history encompassing cooperation across cyber and artificial intelligence, quantum technologies undersea capabilities, hypersonic and counter-hypersonic electronic warfare, information and innovation sharing.

The AUKUS comprises two Pillars. Pillar I focuses on supporting Australia’s acquisition of conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarine capability. Pillar II offers immediate and collaborative opportunities for cutting-edge technologies, production and fielding of relevant warfighting information among the three members. Overall, the basic aim of AUKUS was intended to strengthen deterrence, inject stability in the Indo-Pacific region, and bolster allied integration.

On the other hand, despite the apprehensions about the intentions of the Trump administration on AUKUS, the alliance is continuing to make progress. On 14th November 2025, Australian businesses had gained direct access to the U.S. submarine technical data which is considered to be a major milestone under AUKUS.

Can Australia resist US’s Pressure

Recently, there have been differences between the two in the area of defence budget. On June 1, U.S. Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth publicly demanded that Australia increase its defence spending “as soon as possible”, something that Canberra has flatly refused to do so. Currently, Canberra spends 2 percent of its GDP on defence.

On 4th December 2025 the Trump administration released its National Security Strategy (NSS) which emphasised the increased defence-sharing burden among the allies and partners. In the area of the Indo-Pacific region, although the NSS has emphasised that the region is central to the U.S. strategy, the U.S. defence deployment in the region will not solely be based on defence needs. Basically, the Trump administration is viewing the importance of its defence presence through supply chains, critical minerals, trade routes and industrial security.

In the case of Australia which is a part of the Second Island Chain, Canberra is reliant on the multilateral deterrence headed by the U.S. Although Canberra has resisted the pressure from the U.S. to increase its defence spending to 3.5 percent of the GDP, it will depend on how Canberra is going to resist this pressure in the longer run. Perhaps the bigger question is whether Australia will be willing the share the responsibility of regional security when the U.S. defence presence is decreasing and is coming with conditions.

While the “fear of abandonment” runs deep into Australia’s foreign policy, there is also an aspect of self-identity i.e., being a middle power. Australia has worked to shape the regional order, helping to develop institutions and norms in pursuit of stability and cooperation. However, this aspect of being a middle power is not devoid of the interconnectedness enabled through the U.S. alliance. This alliance has enabled Australia to be a middle power not only in terms of positional aspect but also in terms of functional aspect.