The world is witnessing a tectonic shift in power polarity on the world stage, where major powers such as China, India and Russia are potentially joining great power groups. The current world is moving fast towards multipolarity, which is considered to be most unstable if power is not more or less distributed equally among them. The current situation looks the same, with countries becoming powerful, but a big power parity remains among them. This situation is not ideal for peace, and one can clearly see the increased war and conflict in the different parts of the world. The Russia-Ukraine war in Europe is one of them.
What has happened so far? The war in Europe started with the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 in order to make the Europeans and the US understand that the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) expansion is against Russia’s national interest and it poses a threat to Russia, knowing the objective of NATO as an organization. To date,(November 2024) Russia has captured the Donbas region of Ukraine, which is approximately 20 percent of Ukrainian territory. However, with the help of the West (Europe and the US), Ukraine has given a formidable fight to Russia, but failed to keep Russia out of its territory.
The US election is over, and Donald Trump is back in the White House with a landslide victory. Stopping wars in different parts of the world, especially in Europe, is on his agenda because he has promised the Americans during his election campaign. The democrats under the Biden administration not only failed to bring any decisive peace to Europe but also tried to flair up the conflict by providing its long-range Army Tactical Missiles (ATACMS) to use against Russia. Adding to this, Britain and France have licensed Ukraine to fire 200 km-range (120-mile) SCALP/Storm Shadow missiles into Russia. This caused a major escalation in the war and pushed Russia to give a sign of warning by retaliating with an intermediate ballistic missile (ICBM) capable of carrying Nuclear weapons but lashed with a conventional warhead. Putin also changed Russia’s nuclear doctrine after the US permission to use the missile. Hence, using an ICBM and changing nuclear doctrine is a pronounced message to Ukraine and the West not to take Russia lightly, and shows that they have the capability and willingness to attack Ukraine with tactical nuclear weapons if forced, which exhibits the realist behaviour of a state.
In the complex arena of international relations, Russia’s recent update to its nuclear doctrine represents far more than a mere bureaucratic revision. It is a calculated strategic manoeuvre that displays the core tenets of realist international relations theory—a paradigm that views international politics as a ruthless competition for power, security, and strategic advantage.
From a realist perspective, Russia’s nuclear doctrine update is fundamentally an instrument of statecraft designed to reshape the strategic calculus of its adversaries in Europe. The changes are not about actual nuclear war but about perception, deterrence, and maintaining a strategic edge in an increasingly challenging geopolitical landscape.
Expanding the Realm of Strategic Ambiguity
The most striking aspect of the new doctrine is its deliberate expansion of what constitutes a potential nuclear trigger. By replacing the previous requirement of an “existential threat to the state” with the more elastic concept of a “critical threat to sovereignty,” Russia has effectively lowered the threshold for potential nuclear response while simultaneously increasing strategic uncertainty. This approach is quintessentially Realist. By creating ambiguity, Russia forces its opponents—particularly NATO and the United States—to constantly recalculate the potential costs of their actions. Each military support package, each long-range missile system, and each economic sanction must now be weighed against an increasingly unpredictable nuclear backdrop. The inclusion of Belarus under Russia’s nuclear umbrella is another strategic masterstroke. It’s not merely about military cooperation but about creating a broader strategic buffer zone and signalling to NATO that the potential conflict zone has expanded.
Nuclear Weapons as a Tool of Political Coercion
Realist theory sees nuclear weapons not as instruments of war but as political tools for maintaining and projecting power and bringing peace by deterrence, which means a non-nuclear state fears attacking a nuclear-lashed country, knowing a harsh nuclear retaliation. In the same way, two nuclear-lashed states also refrain from attacking each other due to the Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). Russia’s doctrine update exhibits this perfectly. The explicit mention of holding third-party states responsible for supporting attacks against Russia is a direct attempt to fracture Western unity and deter military support for Ukraine.
The timing is no coincidence. As Ukraine continues to make territorial gains and seeks expanded Western support, Russia is signalling that the stakes of intervention have fundamentally changed. This is a classic realist strategy of using the threat of nuclear escalation as a means of political constraint.
Perception Management and Strategic Positioning when There Is Asymmetry of Stakes
It is crucial to understand that this doctrine is less about actual nuclear use and more about managing perceptions and creating fear in adversaries’ minds. By presenting a broader, more flexible nuclear posture, Russia aims to create a psychological deterrent. The goal is not to start a nuclear war but to make the potential consequences seem so catastrophic that Western powers will hesitate to take assertive actions.
The document’s language deliberately echoes the nuclear doctrines of Western powers, providing Russia with a diplomatic shield. If criticized, they can argue that their approach is consistent with international norms—a sophisticated form of diplomatic manoeuvring that aligns perfectly with realist notions of state behaviour.
A fundamental realist insight is that states perceive and respond to power dynamics differently based on their relative capabilities and perceived vulnerabilities. Russia, recognizing its conventional military limitations against NATO, is leveraging its nuclear arsenal as an asymmetric equalizer. The doctrine signals Russia’s perception of vulnerability—a recognition that it cannot match NATO’s conventional military might. By emphasizing nuclear capabilities, Russia attempts to create a strategic deterrent that compensates for its conventional weaknesses.
Conclusion
Russia’s nuclear doctrine update is not an aberration but a well-calculated strategic document that shows a state’s realist behaviour when a threat arrives at its doorsteps. It’s a calculated attempt to reshape the strategic environment, deter potential adversaries, and maintain geopolitical relevance through the threat of nuclear escalation. The doctrine’s true power lies not in its potential for actual nuclear conflict but in its ability to introduce uncertainty, manage perceptions, and potentially fracture Western unity. It represents a classic example of how states use strategic communication and implied threats to pursue their national interests. As the international community continues to grapple with this new strategic landscape, one thing becomes clear: In the world of international relations, perception can be as powerful as actual military capability.
