The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), loosely known as the Iran Nuclear Deal, was considered a groundbreaking agreement in diplomacy when it was signed in 2015. The agreement paved a potential pathway to resolve the protracted stalemate of Iran’s Nuclear ambition. In 2015, the Islamic Republic of Iran, all five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the US, UK, France, Russia and China plus Germany, along with the European Union (EU), signed the deal in order to deter Iran from developing nuclear weapons. The goal of the deal was to impose severe limitations on the Iranian nuclear programme in the lure of lifting stringent economic sanctions that had crippled the Iranian economy. The UNSC not only endorsed the JCPOA but also affirmed its implementation through resolution 2231. The resolution also highlighted the diplomatic efforts of the parties involved. This article traces the possible rationale that drove Iran’s nuclear ambitions, the following JCPOA breakthrough, the limitations it posed after its breach by the US under the Trump administration in 2018, and the failed endeavours that have yet stalled the deal.
On July 1 1968, Iran signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and vowed to forgo nuclear weapons and abide by the peaceful guidelines of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Iran initiated its nuclear programme back in 1957, during the Shah regime, with the help of the US, then an Iranian ally in the region. A decade later, the cooperation resulted in crystallizing the foremost Nuclear Research Centre in Tehran, and this cooperation kept proliferating till the 1970s when Iran planned to construct 23 nuclear power plants. A few scholars rightly pointed out that if Shah Iran had not fallen, Iran would have built Nuclear weapons in the 1990s.
However, the 1979 revolution changed everything from government to foreign policy, from friend to foe. The relationship between Iran and the US went low, stalling nuclear cooperation between Iran and the US. The sudden geopolitical shock in West Asia after the 1979 revolution changed alignment and realignment in the region. This pursuit was likely fuelled by fraught past relations with the global powers that echoed memories of intervention, occupation, and regime change. Thus, Iran, scarred by territorial losses and foreign-backed coups, perceived the nuclear program as a matter of sovereignty and survival. Moreover, post the Iran-Iraq War, where Saddam Hussein bagged Western support, Iran’s determination for self-reliance and self-defence was further reinforced. Thus, to Tehran, the nuclear program symbolized sovereignty and survival in a hostile region and anarchic international system. It is believed that around the 1990s, Iran resumed its nuclear manoeuvres while adhering to the NPT. However, the sudden disclosure of secret sites in August 2002 by the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), an Iranian opposition group, triggered global anticipation of weapon-grade uranium enrichment. In February 2023, Iranian President Mohammad Khatami accepted that Iran had facilities for “small-scale enrichment experiments” to produce low-enriched uranium for power plants. In May 2023, Iran allowed the IAEA to visit Natanz, an enrichment facility. According to the June 2023 report, the IAEA concluded that Iran had failed to meet its commitments under the safeguards agreement. Subsequently, Iran entered negotiations with France, Germany, and the UK (the EU3), but the US did not participate. In October 2003, the Tehran Declaration was signed, and Iran agreed to cooperate with the IAEA and temporarily suspend uranium enrichment. The Paris Agreement in November 2004 came next. Iran promised to work with the EU-3 to find a diplomatic solution and agreed to temporarily halt enrichment and conversion activities, including those using centrifuges. However, this temporary diplomatic truce quickly unravelled as the US strictly adhered to its isolationist policy and remained preoccupied with counterterrorism measures post-9/11, hindering diplomatic progress. In 2005, Iranian President Ahmadinejad, a hardliner and conservative, took a more aggressive approach to the nuclear programme. Iran restarted uranium enrichment, cut back its cooperation with the IAEA, and defied the international non-proliferation framework. This led to a series of severe sanctions that the UNSC imposed on it, which severely affected the economy of Iran. The sanction curbed its oil exports, frozen assets abroad, and limited access to the global financial system, making it feel the burn of enrichment. In 2013, the breakthrough was finally reached when Hassan Rouhani, a more moderate leader, was elected as the President. He was keen to reform the economy and more open to international engagements. His administration sought to alleviate the economic pressure on Iran by re-negotiating with the international community.
At the heart of the JCPOA were stringent curbs on Iran’s nuclear activities. Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium was reduced to 300 kilograms, and the level of enrichment was capped at 3.67%. The number of operating centrifuges was halved to 5,060. Moreover, the Fordow facility was shut down for uranium enrichment, and the centrifuges at Natanz were dismantled and sealed by the IAEA. The Arak heavy water reactor was reconfigured to cap plutonium, filling its core with concrete. Iran’s nuclear facilities, including Fordow, Natanz and Arak, were repurposed for civilian use and medical and industrial research, with strict limits on the type and number of centrifuges operating. The agreement also mandated rigorous monitoring by granting IAEA inspectors extensive access to declared and undeclared sites to prevent secret nuclear weapons development, with quarterly compliance reports to be sent to the UNSC. A Joint Commission representing all negotiating parties oversaw implementation, resolved disputes, and approved access to suspicious sites. Organizations such as the UN and IAEA play crucial roles in ensuring compliance.
In lieu, the nuclear-related sanctions on Iran were scrapped, which enabled its reintegration into the global economy. All other US sanctions related to terrorism, ballistic missile development, and human rights violations persisted. The implementation of the deal began on January 16, 2016, when Iran abided by its initial obligations. Thus, the US lifted secondary sanctions on Iran’s oil industry and unfroze about $100 billion in assets, giving a big boost to Iran’s economy.The agreement provided a typical snapback mechanism, which gave scope for the sanctions to be reimposed again if Iran was found violating the deal at any point in time. Besides, the agreement also featured a sunset clause under which certain restrictions were to be gradually lifted over time. Even though these phased expiration clauses strengthen global non-proliferation efforts, they have also thrown up grave apprehensions regarding Iran’s potential to resume advanced nuclear programs in the future. This uncertainty was pointed out by critics who feared the deal’s eventual ineffectiveness in preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons.
However, a diplomatic rupture came around in 2018, under the Trump administration, when the United States unilaterally withdrew from the deal, citing its failure to address Iran’s ballistic missile program, regional proxy activities, and sunset provisions which jeopardized the deal. The United States reimposed sanctions in a “maximum pressure” campaign, resulting in a dramatic deterioration in ties. The agreement’s fragility and the eventual disintegration underscore Realism’s core tenets that ‘International Politics is driven by Power struggles’, alliances are temporary, and trust is elusive in a world where states act primarily for self-preservation. The JCPOA was never about fostering long-term peace but rather a pragmatic manoeuvre by all parties to secure immediate strategic advantages.
In retaliation, Iran breached the agreed-upon limits of enrichment (i.e. above the 3.67% threshold), developed new centrifuges, and started heavy water production and uranium enrichment at Fordow. Tensions escalated following the killing of General Qasem Soleimani in 2020, attacks on Iranian facilities and the assassination of a prominent nuclear scientist, widely attributed to Israel. By 2021, Iran had barred the IAEA inspections and suspended the monitoring agreements. European efforts like INSTEX, a barter mechanism for humanitarian trade, struggled to gain traction due to US pressure, exacerbating the diplomatic standoff.
Further, the Restoration efforts were stalled with the election of hardliner Ebrahim Raisi as Iran’s President while escalating regional conflicts and Tehran’s entanglement in the Ukraine and Gaza crisis. Though the diplomatic backchannel began in 2021, momentum was undermined following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the 2023 Israel-Hamas war, leading to a fresh wave of US sanctions targeting Iran’s missile and drone programs in October 2023. Deep fissures persist between Washington and Tehran, with the US designation of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a terrorist organization, which hindered progress. Biden’s diplomatic efforts stalled in 2022 over sanctions relief and Iran’s nuclear actions. Hopes for progress dimmed further in 2023 despite indirect talks that included detainee swaps and the release of frozen Iranian funds. The crisis deepened in October 2024, when Iranian missile strikes on Israel ignited fears of a broader regional conflagration.
A recent IranPoll survey showed that the Gaza conflict has sparked fears of existential threats by Israel that fuel the call for a robust deterrence capability, especially nuclear deterrence. Therefore, one needs to take into account the fact that massive scepticism regarding Western intentions towards Iran has legitimized, so to speak, the need for acquiring the nuclear capability to guarantee their sovereignty. The ascendancy of President Pezeshkian in 2024, who had been backed by reformists and influenced by former foreign minister Javad Zarif, has advocated for a diplomatic rapprochement with the West and is keen on reviving the deal. He believes that lifting sanctions and normalizing ties with the global juggernauts would stabilize the Iranian economy. However, this approach is juxtaposed with the hardline factions within Iran and is much apprehended by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, who holds a sceptical interpretation of Western intentions.
Meanwhile, Iran has been targeted with fresh sanctions over its missiles and drone programmes and alleged arms transfer to Russia. UN Secretary-General António Guterres at the January 2025 World Economic Forum in Davos has urged Tehran to unequivocally reaffirm that its nuclear program is exclusively for ‘peaceful purposes ‘. It is imperative to note that the primary of the JCPOA Deal failed to address Iran’s concerns for nuclear proliferation in the first place. Instead, the diverging priorities of the signatories took precedence rather than tackling Iran’s nuclear ambitions. These ambitions that were conditioned by the past trauma of unequal treaties and thus post 1979 Revolution Iran vowed to curb all the calculative western influence that hampered Iran’s sovereignty. Western powers, particularly United States, along with regional actors like Israel and Saudi Arabia, who have long been U.S. ally in the region have consistently sought to counter Iran’s rise as regional hegemon. The Deal, at it’s inception marked a silver lining in non-proliferation endeavors. However, it failed to fetch any positive peace in the region. And hence a comprehensive approach is essential for overcoming this extant impasse.
