Australia\u2019s defence policy has evolved through various phases. Largely, Australia\u2019s strategic interests were mostly confined to the geo-strategic area of the Indo-Pacific region; as historically threats to Australia have emerged from Southeast Asia. While over the time, the changes in the balance of power among great powers and Australia\u2019s internal capability to respond to threats led to adoption of different strategies.<\/p>\n
Initially its identity of being a former British Colony and World War I, led Australia to tie itself with the collective strategic imperative of the British Empire. Although this arrangement lasted till the 1940s, with the outbreak of World War II both Britain and Australia started to look for another powerful nation for assistance. Thus the situation gave birth to the ANZUS treaty.<\/p>\n
The signing of the Australia, New Zealand and the U.S. (ANZUS) treaty in the 1951 led to the formation of an alliance between the three. The era between the 1950-75s was marked as Australia\u2019s \u201cForward Defence<\/span><\/span><\/a>\u201d. During this period, Australia framed its foreign policy with the objective of it being supported by the great protectors. Australia strategist alignment was defined by the strategic interests pursued by the U.S and it was prevalent in how Australia showed its loyalty by taking the spread of communism seriously.<\/p>\n Alongside, this was also the period when Australia started to project itself as Middle Power. However, with the loss of America in the Vietnam War and the emphasis of the Nixon Doctrine over the allied states to do more for their own security, made Australia to manoeuvre their foreign policy to be more self-reliant.<\/p>\n The period from 1975-97, Australia produced defence white papers in 1976, 1987 and 1994. This period saw the inclusion of the term \u201cself-reliant\u201d in Australia\u2019s defence policy. The 1987 white paper presented \u201cthe strategy of denial<\/span><\/span><\/a>\u201d which laid stress upon bridging Australia\u2019s air and sea capabilities so as to deter any invading force in the future. In addition, the structural changes induced with the end of the bipolar world order, shifts in regional order of Asia- Pacific and the emphasis laid over globalisation and interdependence, redirected Australia to place higher degree of importance on supporting regional engagement and Australia\u2019s strategic alliances.<\/p>\n Furthermore, the subsequent defence white papers of 2003, 2009 (Defending Australia in the Asia-Pacific Century- Force 2030), 2012 and 2016 have categorically highlighted the risks of global terrorism, building of internal capabilities, threats faced with the rise in China\u2019s assertiveness and commitment of investment in defence sector.<\/p>\n The Australian Defence White Paper of 2016<\/span><\/span><\/a> have specifically mentioned about the \u201cstrategy of denial\u201d which is to \u201cto deter, deny and defeat any attempt by a hostile country or non-state actor to attack, threaten to coerce Australia\u201d.<\/p>\n The strategy of denial dates back to the Defence White Paper of 1987<\/span><\/span><\/a> which stressed that Australia\u2019s priority concern would be to deny the adversary effective use of the sea and air gap. Given the gist, the strategies of denial is very context specific. The rationale behind the adoption of these strategies will depend on how Australia defines its strategic interests, perceives its strategic environment, threat and extent of internal capability. For instance, in the Defence White Paper of 2016 Australia has emphasised over the strategic importance of the Indo-Pacific region, the continuance of the U.S. alliance and the threats from China\u2019s growing assertiveness. In terms of threats, specific strategies will be used based on the nature of the threat. In short, the strategy of denial is not a \u201cone size fits all\u201d strategy.<\/p>\n With the beginning of the 2020s, Australia has been living in a complex strategic environment which is characterised by- wars in Europe and the Middle East, China\u2019s aggressive actions in the Indo-Pacific region, the chaos of climate change, the re-election of the Trump administration and the emergence of technological competition over artificial intelligence.<\/p>\n Given these challenges, on 17th April 2024 the Australian government had unveiled two documents- National Defence Strategy of 2024 (NDS-24) and Integrated Investment Program of 2024 (IIP-24). The NDS is designed based on the concerns which were addressed in the National Defence Strategy of 2023. For instance, the NDS-24 has approved the investment of A$42.1 billion on defence especially on submarines and their infrastructure over the decade. In addition, the NDS-24 has also prioritized increased investment in the collaboration under AUKUS to enhance undersea warfare capabilities.<\/p>\n Regardless of the positive development and precision in Australia\u2019s strategy, the process of trying to deter an adversary is complex<\/span><\/span><\/a>. There are all-encompassing capabilities and forces. In addition, there should also be an intent to use those capabilities and forces whenever there is an attack by an adversary. On the other hand, Michael Clarke<\/span><\/span><\/a> has pointed at the vagueness of Australia\u2019s strategy in terms of its usage of nuclear-powered submarines (SSN). He questions the lack of intent and strategy to put the SSN submarines in use.<\/p>\n This vagueness, according to him, questions the effectiveness of the deterrence capability of Australia. In addition, although the NDS-24 has emphasised over the procurement of submarines but given the slow rate of production and the constraints faced by the U.S. Navy Shipyards, it will also have an implicit effect on Australia\u2019s submarine procurement till the 2030s.<\/p>\n In addition, the NDS-24 has planned to increase defence workforce funding from A$17.1 billion to A$25.2 billion so as to facilitate the importance of a skilled workforce for maintaining and operating military capabilities. However, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) is composed of only 80,000 personnels<\/span><\/span><\/a>. The concern is whether the augmented defence budget is going to lead to the recruitment of more defence personnels in the future or not. The crux is that to curate a well-defined strategy of deterrence by denial, the size of the ADF should be enough to pose a threat in the minds of potential adversaries.<\/p>\nAustralia\u2019s Attempt to be \u2018Self-reliant\u2019<\/h3>\n
Australia\u2019s Defence Strategy of Denial<\/h3>\n
\nAmong the strategies of denial there are three major strands- anti-access denial, area-denial and dissuasion by denial.<\/p>\n\n
Australia\u2019s Deterrence By Denial Strategy<\/h3>\n
Can SSN submarines truly deter adversaries?<\/h3>\n
Limitations of Workforce in Australia\u2019s Defence Forces<\/h3>\n