{"id":6400,"date":"2025-04-21T17:10:23","date_gmt":"2025-04-21T11:40:23","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/thedialectics.org\/?p=6400"},"modified":"2026-07-15T09:15:42","modified_gmt":"2026-07-15T09:15:42","slug":"the-politics-over-critical-mineral-resources-in-the-times-of-trump-2-0","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/thedialectics.org\/the-politics-over-critical-mineral-resources-in-the-times-of-trump-2-0\/","title":{"rendered":"The politics over critical mineral resources in the times of Trump 2.0"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

A brief context on critical mineral energy and its complexity<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n

The new technological innovation and alterations in industrial manufacturing is reshaping the global economic structure and supply chain. Along with this there is an unprecedented demand for renewable resource production, sustainable energy goals and national defence technology, which has made the acquisition and maintenance of security of critical mineral supply chains the need of the hour.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As the entire gamut of critical minerals is constantly adjusted according to the changes both at the domestic and international fronts, any disruption in the supply chain can result in a ripple effect across regions. Moreover, the complexity<\/a> also stems from the fact that critical minerals resources encompasses the need for undisrupted comprehensive supply, technology, politics and trade competition. It is not just fixated on mineral acquisition, mining and diversification of ore supplies. Since sensitivities and vulnerabilities come attached to the critical mineral supply chain due to their dependence on cutting-edge technology, uneven global distribution of resource reserves and unpredictability of the international external environment, it has exacerbated the securitization process of the same in the current times.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The report on \u201cCritical Minerals and Great Power Competition<\/a>\u201d which was published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) in October 2024 has pointed at the existing caveat in the usage of the term critical or strategic minerals. For instance, the European Union and the U.S. uses the term critical mineral which points at the vulnerability of the same given the disruption of supply chain in any given time. On the other hand, China and Russia prefer to use strategic minerals given the fact that these resources are available within the geographical scope of their state and the potential for strategic industries. However, the different usage of the term indicates variation of policy but vulnerability is present in both. Such variations of perceptions compels states to pursue policies which are aimed at serving their self-interests and in this case the uninterrupted supply of critical minerals resources and demands for the same in the market has ignited yet another geopolitical game.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Current scenario regarding critical mineral resources<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n

The hype and concerns about critical mineral resources have again caught the attention of the world. Previously the Joe Biden administration had passed an Executive Order 14017 <\/a> in the year 2021, which aimed at strengthening the domestic critical mineral supply chain. The order was passed as one of the measures to make America self-sufficient and to compete with China.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, the recent bilateral agreement signed between the U.S. and the Ukraine over critical mineral resources have sparked concerns. There are reports which have stated the U.S. had bargained with Ukraine for critical minerals resources in lieu for continuing defence security in the ongoing Ukraine-Russia war. However, the final draft of the agreement does not designate<\/a> the rights of US$500 billion worth of revenue to the U.S. nor does it include a security guarantee for Ukraine. The agreement establishes a reconstruction investment fund with joint U.S. and Ukraine ownership. Moreover, this agreement does not mention any kind of security guarantee from the U.S. to the Ukraine but it is a joint U.S.-Ukraine energy investment. However, the entire process from signing the agreement to mining of minerals will take years altogether due to lengthy procedures and lack of geological mapping. Hence, it will be too early to predict if this particular agreement will unleash major changes in the coming months. Nevertheless, this agreement can be viewed from the perspective of the U.S. addressing its own vulnerability of critical mineral resources through the use of its power. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

This agreement was signed at a time when the Ukraine-Russia war was shaped by crucial development in terms of difference in approach of the Trump administration 2.0 towards this war. By questioning the utility of continuing to aid Ukraine both financially and militarily, the Trump administration has moved towards a transactional method of diplomacy<\/a> and in this case, it is access to critical mineral resources. Basically, it has leveraged the conflict situation to gain access to critical mineral resources of Ukraine. Given the fact that global energy dependence has shifted from traditional natural resources to critical mineral and rare earth minerals, there has been an upsurge in the demand of the latter. As these resources are used for dual purposes (military and civilian industries) and the uneven distribution of the same has posed a serious challenge to all the states due to their dependency in the global supply chain and the imbalance between demand and supply of the same.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Apprehensions among the Southeast Asian States<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n

According to the report published by the International Energy Agency (IEA<\/a>), China is the largest supplier for lithium, cobalt and graphite and Indonesia for nickel. The region of Southeast Asia holds around 26% of the global reserve of nickel. Indonesia<\/a> has the bulk reserve accounting to 22% of nickel, 16% of tin and 4% of bauxite and the Philippines has 4% of nickel. Vietnam and Myanmar have about 18% of unexplored global rare earth reserves respectively. Since critical mineral resources can be highly vulnerable to supply shocks, extreme weather (which can disrupt mining or hamper export), trade disruptions; states with greater reserves can control the outflow of the same during geopolitical tensions. For instance, amid the escalating tech-war between the U.S. and China, in December 2024<\/a> China had imposed restrictions on the export of gallium, germanium and antimony; which are some of the key minerals for semiconductor production to the U.S. This was simultaneously followed by an additional imposition of export control announcements by China in February 202<\/a>5 on a range of materials including tungsten, tellurium, bismuth, indium and molybdenum- key minerals used in defence and tech- application development. These steps are as a retaliatory measure against the escalating tensions on tech-war and tariffs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Given the context of tariffs and retaliatory export restrictions by both the U.S. and China, on March 20 2025 the Trump administration passed an executive order which launched a federal push to expand domestic mineral production so as to meet up their domestic needs. This order targets to advance the Ambler Access Project, a 211-mile industrial road through Northwest Alaska that enables commercial mining for copper, zinc and other materials. Subsequently, the Trump administration has also invoked emergency powers to ramp up U.S. production of critical minerals and rare earth minerals. According to the White House report<\/a> \u201cdemand for critical minerals has dubbed the gold rush of the 21st<\/sup> century due to their importance in emerging technologies\u201d. The report has also stated that the U.S. is currently importing 100% of its critical minerals, especially 70% from China. Given over-dependence on imports, if this dependency on China continues it will pose a serious threat to national security of the U.S. In addition, this particular move will promote job creation<\/a> and economic prosperity by revitalizing domestic mining and processing industries.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On the other hand, as mentioned above, there are certain states in the Southeast Asian region which have rich reserves of critical mineral resources. These states have particularly witnessed a boost in demand for critical mineral resources ever since the escalation of tech-war between the U.S. and China. In addition, there is a plummeting global demand for electric vehicles (EVs). In short, the geopolitical tensions and the rise in new technological innovation has led to diversification of global supply chains. The states of the Southeast Asian region are having an extra added advantage not only due to the presence of critical mineral reserves but also their keenness to utilities opportunities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, the geopolitical situation which was prevailing during the U.S.-China tech war has witnessed alteration. The Trump administration 2.0 has already begun its onslaught to impose tariffs and reciprocal tariffs with respect to each foreign trading partner. The problem with the U.S. led tariff war is that the end-game is not clear. As the imposition of tariffs to address huge trade deficits cannot be the only way to deal with every state.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The states of the Southeast Asian region are apprehensive about the probable imposition of tariffs by the U.S. due to trade surplus. Moreover, the drastic moves taken by the Trump administration 2.0 has exposed the dependencies that the region has over the U.S. The withdrawal of the USAID<\/a> (the United States Agency for International Development) will affect the continuity of the energy programs such as the Southeast Asia Smart Power Program (SPP). As is region is inching closer towards sustainable energy, lack of technical assistance from the U.S. will act as a bottleneck to achieve the same. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/a>Additionally, the states of the Southeast Asian region are also concerned about the transactional method of diplomacy of the U.S., which is seen in the case of Ukraine. What if the U.S. tries to exploit the region\u2019s critical mineral resources as a bargaining chip in return for defence and strategic guarantees. There is no doubt that the U.S. wants to reduce its dependence on China for the import of critical mineral resources and hence seeks to diversify the source for procuring the same. However, the doubt which has been posed after witnessing the deal between the U.S.-Ukraine, is contextually different. And the region of Southeast and East Asia which are characterised by the presence and rivalry among two great powers i.e., the U.S. and China, there are vital interests at stake. If hypothetically the U.S. uses such bargaining tactics, it is going to rupture both its soft and hard power in the region. Moreover as China is a threat for the U.S., the latter cannot jeopardise its dominance (especially hard power) in the region by using critical mineral resources as a bargaining chip. For instance, on April 02 2025, the U.S. Department of State has approved a potential Foreign Military Sale of 20 advanced F-16<\/a> Fighter Jets to the Philippines which is estimated US$5.58 billion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On the other hand, what these states of the region can do is to diversify their market and export of critical mineral resources. Since every crisis brings new opportunities, the Southeast Asian states need to frame and execute policies which are going to ensure their sustainable energy transition and diversify its market of critical mineral resources. The goal should be to build resilience and not to risk by putting all eggs in one basket.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

A brief context on critical mineral energy and its complexity The new technological innovation and alterations in industrial manufacturing is reshaping the global economic structure and supply chain. Along with this there is an unprecedented demand for renewable resource production, sustainable energy goals and national defence technology, which has made the acquisition and maintenance of […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":34,"featured_media":6401,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[176,179,180],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-6400","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-geopolitics-articles","category-in-depth-apr-25","category-magazine"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/thedialectics.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6400","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/thedialectics.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/thedialectics.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/thedialectics.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/34"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/thedialectics.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=6400"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/thedialectics.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6400\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":12572,"href":"https:\/\/thedialectics.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6400\/revisions\/12572"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/thedialectics.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/6401"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/thedialectics.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=6400"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/thedialectics.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=6400"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/thedialectics.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=6400"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}