The Gaza war has undeniably interrupted the pace of Saudi-Israel normalization, at least temporarily calling a halt to the diplomatic talks that were unfolding under American brokered mediation. But history attests that with the Palestinian problem as an emotive and political consideration, nevertheless realpolitik and national interest tend to predominate ultimately. The only question is whether Saudi-Israel normalization is forever removed from the table, or simply when and how it will re-emerge.
The Shifting Landscape of Middle Eastern Diplomacy
Before the October 2023 Gaza war, Saudi-Israel normalization was increasingly picking up steam. The United States, eager to have another milestone under its belt in the Abraham Accords, was actively brokering talks between Riyadh and Tel Aviv. Saudi Arabia, in turn, was looking at a security agreement with the U.S. and civilian nuclear cooperation—both strong enticements that suited its long-term goals.
The war shifted the dynamics, though. The extensive damage in Gaza, along with growing civilian losses, exerted great pressure on Saudi Arabia to decouple from Israel, at least publicly. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), previously receptive to normalization, was forced to adjust his position in reaction to domestic and regional indignation. Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan clarified that normalization was “off the table” until there was a way to Palestinian statehood. This was a temporary reprieve but not an absolute conclusion.
The Palestinian Cause: A Historical Trend of Declining Priority
The Palestinian cause has been a call to arms in Arab politics for a long time. Yet, as time has shown, its importance wanes as national interests dictate. During the 1960s and 70s, the Palestinian cause was at the heart of Arab solidarity, with the likes of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria being highly engaged. But as time went on, most of these nations focused on their own security and economic interests.
Egypt initially breached the pan-Arab position by signing the Camp David Accords in 1978 and initiating peace with Israel. Though it faced opposition in the beginning, Egypt acted on the compulsion to win back Sinai and get American financial support. In a similar way, Jordan also legitimized peace with Israel in 1994 since economic and security ties with Israel were deemed greater than ideological commitments.
The Abraham Accords of 2020 was another threshold moment when the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan normalized relations with Israel. These nations did not define their moves in terms of economic prosperity, technological innovation, and strategic advantage but not ideological support for Palestine. Saudi Arabia, the most powerful Arab state, has so far refused, but the long-term direction is that normalization is inevitable.
Israel: A Growing Power in West Asia
One of the main forces behind Saudi-Israel normalization is the inexorable ascension of Israel as a technology and military superpower. Israel has become a leader in cybersecurity, artificial intelligence, defence technology, and water management—fields pivotal to the Saudi Vision 2030.
For Riyadh, the access to Israel’s high-tech is also a desired opportunity. The Saudi economy is diversifying from dependence on oil, and collaboration with Israel’s high-tech sector could give impetus to innovation in artificial intelligence, aggrotech, and renewable energy. Additionally, the military technologies of Israel, especially it’s state-of-the-art missile defence systems such as the Iron Dome and David’s Sling, can be of immense use to Saudi Arabia’s defence.
Aside from technology, Israel’s strategic alliance with the United States makes normalization a desirable option. Saudi Arabia has long depended on American security assurances, and joining forces with Israel could further solidify its clout in Washington. The recent effort to negotiate a U.S.-Saudi defence agreement was partly tied to normalization negotiations with Israel. Although those negotiations are currently suspended, the strategic rationale for them is still in place.
Iran: The Greater Threat to Saudi Arabia
Though the Palestinian question is symbolic, it is overshadowed by Saudi Arabia’s most immediate regional concern—Iran. Saudi foreign policy has been defined for decades as countering Iranian expansion in the Middle East. The competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia is ideological, sectarian, and geopolitical, from Yemeni and Syrian to Lebanese and Iraqi conflicts.
Iran’s increasing power through proxy forces such as Hezbollah and the Houthis directly threatens Riyadh’s security. The recent Houthi missile and drone strikes on Saudi soil, reportedly backed by Tehran, underscore the need to counter Iranian aggression. In contrast to Israel, which does not pose a direct territorial threat to Saudi Arabia, Iran actively supports and arms forces that erode Saudi interests.
The Saudi-Israel moves towards normalization prior to the Gaza conflict were centred primarily in this framework—a united front against Iran. Israel and Saudi Arabia have a shared fear of Tehran’s nuclear program and destabilizing activities within the region. This shared foe is a very solid basis upon which to build future normalization, even as temporary challenges hinder it.
Normalization: A Question of Timing, Not Possibility
Though the Gaza war has temporarily stalled the Saudi-Israel normalization process, history indicates that economic and strategic interests will ultimately prevail over short-term setbacks. The international reaction to the conflict, including demands for Palestinian statehood, might alter the timing, but not the long-term direction.
There are a number of reasons why normalization remains on the horizon:
1. Economic Diversification: Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 stresses technological development and foreign investment. Israel, with its status as a tech power, is the natural ally.
2. Security Imperatives: The threat from Iran remains the overarching anxiety for Saudi Arabia, and this makes Israel an available security ally.
3. U.S. Influence: Washington continues to urge Saudi-Israel normalization as the linchpin of its Middle East policy.
4. Changing Arab Priorities: The larger Arab world has demonstrated a reduced willingness to permit the Palestinian problem to drive foreign policy choices.
The Scars of War and the Force of National Interest
The recent diplomatic hiccup between Israel and Saudi Arabia is not unique. History abounds in instances where short-term political interests postponed but did not preclude fundamental geopolitical changes. The wounds of the Gaza conflict are still fresh, but with the passage of time, the imperative of national interest will override.
Though Saudi Arabia can’t overtly accept normalization in the face of a humanitarian crisis, there will be a gradual move towards rhetoric and engagement in the years to come. Track-two diplomacy, business partnerships, and discreet intelligence exchange can carry on even if official recognition is deferred.
As the Palestinian issue recedes from view—as it has with Egypt, Jordan, and the UAE—the pragmatic gains of normalization will be greater than ideological devotion. Saudi Arabia, being a pragmatic state, will eventually prefer economic growth, technological innovation, and regional security to symbolic politics.
Conclusion: A Pause, Not a Full Stop
The Gaza conflict has certainly retarded the Saudi-Israel normalization process but it has not brought it to an end. Saudi Arabia, as other Arab nations ahead of it, will come around eventually from ideological concerns and welcome Israel for its technological and security benefits. The question isn’t really if normalization would take place, but when Riyadh would begin to see the right political window to move forward.
Iran is still far more of an issue for Saudi Arabia than Israel, and it will push Riyadh towards Tel Aviv over time. As the past has proven, national interests always come first above emotional or ideological affinities. War wounds will heal, but the rationality of Saudi-Israel normalization will be much greater than ever before.
