In the African Continent, a discreet struggle for dominance is brewing. In this geopolitical battle, Russia has emerged as an adept player who has mastered the unconventional method to manoeuvre its interest across the continent via its proxy arm, i.e. the Wagner group. The group has been an essential tool in Russia’s foreign policy toolkit. This article traces Russia’s strategic manoeuvres in Africa, particularly through the Wagner Group and its interests in the continent, focusing on resource extraction, military presence, and political influence.
How does the West see?
Russia’s argument is that, as well as that of certain African nations engaged with the group, Russia’s presence on the continent is to be seen as that of a foreign entity providing assistance to fragile states and helping to prevent further instability. The Wagner group claims to merely render military aid and security to unstable regimes. Despite these official denials, Wagner’s activities are allegedly viewed, particularly by the West, as part of Russia’s global ambitions.
The Geneva Center for Security Policy in its Geneva paper 32/24, views Russia’s involvement in the region through theoretical lenses like the Primakov and Gerasimov Doctrines. While the former doctrine stresses on a multipolar world that specifically deters the unipolarity of the United States by forging global partnerships, especially in an arena like Africa, where Russia seeks to secure a foothold. The latter doctrine emphasizes on Russia’s covert engagement via the Wagner in the sub-Saharan region. Thus, as per the West, by operating in the legal grey area, Wagner blurs the line between legitimate military action and prohibited mercenary activities.
What is Wagner?
The roots of Wagner can be traced back to 2014 when Dmitry Utkin, a former officer of Russia’s military intelligence agency (GRU) founded the organization during Russia’s annexation of Crimea. While Utkin assumed the role of military commander, Yevgeny Prigozhin, an oligarch with close ties to President Putin, boosted it financially. Albeit Prigozhin initially denied any involvement however, later in 2022, he admitted to founding the group and subsequently, Wagner transitioned into a registered legal entity, headquartered in St. Petersburg. Wagner first gained international prominence amid the conflict in Ukraine, particularly during Prigozhin’s power struggle with Russian military leaders, which culminated in his 2023 mutiny, a dramatic 36-hour standoff. However, following his demise, a couple of months later, the leadership was taken over by his son, Pavel Prigozhin.
Post Prigozhin’s demise, the Kremlin seized tighter control over Wagner’s steadfast influence in Africa, thus leading to the rise of the Africa Corps (Afrikanskiy Korpus) under the Russian Ministry of Defence. Consequently, a shift is noted from Wagner’s relative independence to a more centralized, state-controlled approach, ensuring Russia’s continued presence while reducing the risk of another semi-autonomous force. Eventually, the leadership was entrusted with Yunus-bek Yevkurov, a Deputy Defense Minister and Andrei Averyanov, a GRU general who then emerged as forerunners steering these mercenary activities that blend harmoniously with the strategic interests of Russia.
How and Where?
Wagner’s modus operandi in Africa often combines military expertise, strategic resource extraction, and political manoeuvring. Here, the group engages in upfront combat, and its broader strategy hinges on securing political relationships through a clientelist network, particularly in autocratic regimes. Thus, by offering military assistance in lieu of economic concessions such as access to resource reservoirs or securing lucrative mining contracts, the Wagner group operates as a vehicle for Resource diplomacy. Being active in over 30 countries across the globe, Wagnersoperational footprint includes Ukraine, Syria, Venezuela and of all Africa, which remains its primary theatre. Russia has military cooperation agreements with 43 African nations and a growing presence in the continent’s mining and energy sectors, particularly through concessions granted to Wagner-affiliated companies. In addition to these economic ventures, Russia has signed nuclear cooperation agreements with 20 African countries and plans to construct nuclear power plants in Egypt and Nigeria, further consolidating its strategic presence.
In Libya, the Russian flights to Al Khadim airbase near Benghazi have surged and negotiations for a new port signal Moscow’s intent to maintain its Mediterranean influence. Russia’s liaison with Libya dates back to 2016 when it began backing warlord Khalifa Haftar with military support. With Libya’s vast oil reserves at stake, state-owned Rosneft has brokered lucrative deals, but Algeria’s opposition to Russian backing for Haftar complicates Moscow’s plans.
For the African nations, the choice to “bandwagon” with Russia may be deemed as a strategic move while receiving military assistance against rebel groups without any strings attached. Traditional Western powers like France militarily orchestrated over fifty times to persist through the Françafrique network. In Mali, for instance, the Wagner forces swiftly swayed the departing French troops, thus strengthening the ruling junta’s resistance against jihadists that, in turn enabled Russia to exert influence in resource-rich regions of Africa. Recent Reports of a military convoy arriving from Syria to Bamako have further highlighted Russia’s potent manoeuvres to secure resources like uranium, gold, oil, and gas. Similarly, in Burkina Faso, following its 2022 coup, it turned to Moscow as an alternative to France to combat its insurgent threats.
Wagner’s deed in Africa portrays a typical instance of barter exchange that trades military assistance to access resources and strives for political influence. Wagner’s involvement in the Central African Republic (CAR) demonstrates this typical pattern. Initially arriving as military trainers in 2018, the Wagner forces soon found themselves on the frontlines securing President Touadéra’s re-election in 2021. Hence, Wagner and its affiliates superseded key sectors of the CAR’s economy, including diamond and gold mines, breweries, and media outlets, thus further embedding themselves into the country’s economic and political tapestry. (Tracing Wagner Group’s footprint in Africa, 2023, ICWA) In addition, soft power efforts such as the Russian House Cultural Centre in Bangui further cemented Moscow’s influence.
By the same token, Wagner arrived in Sudan (in 2018) and secured rights on gold reserves through Prigozhin-linked Meroe Gold. According to the Geneva-based Global Initiative Against Transnational Organised Crime, the Group prolonged post Omar al-Bashir’s fall and is allegedly supplying arms to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) amid Sudan’s ongoing power struggle. Here, the major imperative Moscow looks out for is to secure a naval base and Mineral rights.
The Kremlin’s ventures in North Africa, the Sahel, and southern Africa can be considered an exchange mechanism whereby the role of force multiplier and security provider is played in return for investment rights on essential resources and continued influence in the continent. The West views Russia’s engagement through Wagner as an act of offshore balancing and economic exploitation without contributing towards the advancement of the local populace. There are instances of resentment among a few of the African Nations regarding the involvement of the group. Nigeria has already voiced its concerns over Russia’s role in deepening the fissures within regional bodies like ECOWAS, while bolstering the Sahel Alliance has further strained relations.
